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Abstract
This editorial introduces the thematic issue and considers what the articles tell us about new approaches to studying polit-
ical leadership and populism. The editorial surveys the set of eleven articles by referring to their geographic concentration
(North America and Europe), along withmethodological and thematic similarities. In conclusion, the set of articles displays
the diverse theoretical and methodological approaches currently employed in cutting-edge research on populism and po-
litical leadership.
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1. Introduction
The study of populism in all subfields of political sci-
ence has expanded significantly over the last several
years. Brexit, Donald Trump’s presidency, the “yellow
jacket” protests in France, and Venezuela’s Bolivarian
government are some of the many examples where
political events spread across countries and continents
have made headlines and attracted scholarly attention.
Alongside this trend, the study of political leadership is
enjoying a renaissance. Mark Bennister notes that the
“recent rich flowering of research presents opportuni-
ties for scholars to move the field forward” (Bennister,
2016, p. 1).
At first blush, the concept of populism seems anti-
thetical to leadership; in reality populism is deeply tied to
political leaders and the exercise of leadership. Populist
movements almost always generate or select a cham-
pion, a leader who represents the people. However, as
Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (2014) warn,
while most manifestations of populism produce flam-
boyant and strong political leaders, the link between
political leadership and populism is not straightforward.
Populism can exist comfortably with various types of
leadership, and sometimes appears in leaderless form
(Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2014, p. 1).
This thematic issue of Politics and Governance gath-
ers new, cutting-edge research focused on the inter-
section of populism and political leadership. Here we
approach populism as a broad ideology centering on
appeals to “the people” and critiques of “the corrupt
elites.” In the call for papers we invited studies particu-
larly focusing on populism as an instrument employed
by leaders, as a challenge for leaders, and examining
whether populism influences what sorts of leaders and
policies citizens support and eschew. As discussed in
more detail below, the final set of eleven articles di-
vides rather cleanly among those concerning populism
in North America, those focusing on Europe, along with
a few studies comparing both areas.
2. Leadership and Populism in North America, or as
Compared with the United States
Seven articles concern leadership and populism in North
America. Of these, four studies rather directly engage the
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populist leadership of the American president Donald
Trump, who remains in office at the time of writing. In
his study of “The Populist Radical Right in the US: New
Media and the 2018 Arizona Senate Primary,” Jeremy
Roberts notes that in the wake of Trump’s presiden-
tial victory, “pitched battles for the Republican Party’s
soul broke out in primaries across the country” (Roberts,
2020, p. 111). Roberts asks a simple but important ques-
tion: Given that populist radical right candidates, à la
Trump, do not belong to the Republican party establish-
ment, how do they win Republican primary contests and
so access real power? Drawing upon some European
analyses concerning the bases of populism, Roberts con-
cludes that the case of the 2018 Arizona Senate primary
demonstrates that voters’ expectations about party con-
vergence, along with social media consumption, helps to
explain how populist citizens mobilize to support partic-
ular leaders in primary contests (Roberts, 2020).
In a somewhat similar vein, AllesandroNai focuses on
“The Trump Paradox: How Cues from a Disliked Source
Foster Resistance to Persuasion” (Nai, 2020). Noting
that populist leaders often deliberately exhibit a bad-
mannered style, that “dislike voting” is increasingly rele-
vant, and that Trump is a widely disliked figure outside of
the United States (US), he probes the persuasive power
of communications from controversial figures. On the ba-
sis of an experimental study with 272 students, he con-
cludes that a simple endorsement from the President,
positive or negative, substantially alters how issue-based
messages are perceived. Nai (2020) suggests the source
of themessagemaymattermore than themessage’s con-
tent when populist leaders disseminate communications
to citizens.
Nai’s interest in discerning what motivates voters to
accept or reject populist leaders is mirrored in my arti-
cle with Gerard Seijts. In “How Do Populist Voters Rate
Their Political Leaders? Comparing Citizen Assessments
in Three Jurisdictions,” we set out to explore how a sam-
ple of voters in the US, Canada, and the United Kingdom
use a leader character framework to assess the charac-
ter of some contemporary national leaders (Seijts & de
Clercy, 2020). In probing whether citizens who lean to-
ward populism view character the same as ordinary vot-
ers, we find these groups are quite different. Populists in
all three jurisdictions believe that leader character mat-
ters much less than in the case of ordinary citizens, who
clearly place more value on the importance of leader
character. This finding is important for understanding
how populist voters generally evaluate politicians, and
why they may be drawn to some leaders over others
(Seijts & de Clercy, 2020).
A cross-national comparative approach also grounds
Michael Hameleers’ study of “Populist Disinformation:
Exploring Intersections between Online Populism and
Disinformation in the US and the Netherlands” (2020).
Through undertaking a qualitative content analysis of
Donald Trump andGeertWilders’ social media discourse,
Hameleers finds both leaders use such outlets to ex-
press their distrust in established institutions, senti-
ments which appear to resonate among those citizens
who support populism (Hameleers, 2020).
Interestingly, Hameleers finds such criticisms are not
articulated by mainstream or left-wing populist leaders.
In this vein—how national leaders use social media—
Kenny Ie’s (2020) article on “Tweeting Power: The
Communication of Leadership Roles on Prime Ministers’
Twitter” may be usefully read. He analyzes how Canada’s
Justin Trudeau and Britain’s Theresa May use Twitter
to create personalized leader–follower relationships in
terms of their role performance and function.
Following on Trump’s 2016 election, Brian Budd ex-
amines whether the nativist and xenophobic rhetoric
of populist leaders in the US and Western Europe
has permeated Canada’s most populous province. Budd
concludes in “The People’s Champ: Doug Ford and
Neoliberal Right-Wing Populism in the 2018 Ontario
Provincial Election” (2020) that while Ford’s election is
one of the fewdomestic cases of successful populist lead-
ership, Trumpian politics has not in fact spilled across the
49th parallel. Instead, he finds Ford successfully created
a conception of “the people” using an economic and anti-
cosmopolitan discourse centered onmiddle-class taxpay-
ers and opposition to urban elites. Budd’s (2020) study,
along with the Roberts (2020) analysis, helpfully delin-
eate some of the ideological variation within populism,
and both underscore the creative capacity of populist
leaders to select and incorporate particular aspects of
this ideology.
Similar to Budd’s concern to probe the implica-
tions of American populism for neighbouring Canada,
Mario Levesque takes the entrenchment of the ne-
oliberal state and the rise of populist political leaders
in Canada as key elements in examining local disabil-
ity leadership. Levesque’s (2020) study of “Leadership
as Interpreneurship: A Disability Nonprofit Atlantic
Canadian Profile” points out that disability leaders may
face significant challenges where populist politicians on
the right justify service reductions and budget cuts as
necessary to reduce the resources devoted to such “spe-
cial interests.” Levesque concludes survival in the cur-
rent context means disability leaders have become in-
terpreneurs, working to sustain operations increasingly
within dense networks and relying on interpersonal con-
nections, shared resources, and superior communication
skills (Levesque, 2020). He expresses some doubt as to
whether this adaptation is viable over the longer term.
3. Leadership and Populism in European Case Studies,
or in Cross-National Perspective
The second group of papers comprises four studies
that are situated within Europe, or that reference the
European context. Tina Burrett’s study of Vladimir Putin
in power, titled “Charting Putin’s Shifting Populism in
the Russian Media from 2000 to 2020,” assesses to what
degree he can truly be considered a populist politician
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across the two decades of his rule. Burrett argues that a
key element to his leadership success lies in Putin’s capac-
ity to shift his populist discourse from its original focus
on domestic “enemies” toward international ones, along
with a growing emphasis on the West’s “otherness.” She
concludes Putin’s leadership fits most closely with discur-
sive descriptions of populism, although there is evidence
he has become less populist and more nationalist over
time (Burrett, 2020).
In his study, “Revisiting the Inclusion-Moderation
Thesis on Radical Right Populism: Does Party Leadership
Matter?” Laurent Bernhard (2020) similarly focuses on
tracing the chronological evolution of populist leader-
ship through examining the Geneva Citizens’ Movement
(MCG), a Swiss party on the radical right. Bernhard’s inter-
est is in how the nature of a populist party’s leadership
(traditional or managerial) is related to adopting more
mainstream positions. On the basis of analysing partisan
communications, he concludes the MCG’s mainstream-
ing owes to governmental participation as well as an in-
ternal transfer of power from the traditional leadership
to the managerial wing (Bernhard, 2020).
In “Veridiction and Leadership in Transnational
Populism: The Case of DiEM25,” Evangelos Fanoulis and
Simona Guerra probe how the Democracy in Europe
Movement 2025 (DiEM25) has developed since 2016
as a pan-European political movement aimed at de-
mocratizing the European Union. They ask whether the
movement’s leadership has succeeded in constructing a
transnational “people” by promoting its Euroalternative
discourse. Focusing on leader Yanis Varoufakis’s veridic-
tion (or truth-telling) speech and agency, the authors
conclude that while Euroalternativism has been success-
ful in capitalizing on transnationalism, the spread of pop-
ulism can be limited by national borders (Fanoulis &
Guerra, 2020).
The final study is Henry Milner’s “Populism and
Political Knowledge: The United States in Comparative
Perspective” (2020). Milner illustrates the trenchant dif-
ferences in adult education among developed democra-
cies, comparing high functional literacy levels in Sweden,
the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway against the rela-
tively low literacy levels in the United Kingdom, Ireland,
and the US. Moreover, he notes older respondents are
more informed than the younger “Internet generation”
inmost countries. Arguing that low political knowledge is
related to populism and support for Trump in particular,
he calls for better and more comprehensive data on po-
litical knowledge and populist attitudes (Milner, 2020).
4. Conclusion
Milner’s (2020) focus on the US in comparison with
Europe’s advanced democracies returns this discussion
to its origin. This collection of articles underscores the
rise of populism across national boundaries, and sev-
eral authors here rely directly or indirectly on Europe’s
long experience with populism for insight and context
vis-à-vis populism in North America. As well, the arti-
cles share a couple of several thematic similarities. First,
the articles by Roberts, Nai, Hameleers, Budd, Burrett,
and Fanoulis and Guerra focus on how leaders’ com-
munications inform, attract (or repel), or mobilize pop-
ulist citizens. A second common theme in the Roberts,
Seijts and de Clercy, Hameleers, and Milner studies con-
cerns discerning how populist voters differ from ordi-
nary, non-populist citizens. Reading these articles to-
gether, populism’s widespread affect across the diverse
cases under study here is striking, as is the need to con-
tinue to explore and explain its intersection with politi-
cal leadership.
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